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C H A P T E R  6
Imitation, Communion, and 
Culture
Ann Cale Kruger
Despite some physical similarities to our great ape cousins, humans are dis-
tinguished by big brains. Brain volume in humans is roughly three times 
greater than it is in apes.1 Humans are also distinguished by their ability 
to create culture—tools, languages, art, institutions, societies, and govern-
ments—culture that accumulates modifi cations over time. Humans transmit 
their cultural knowledge to subsequent generations, who adopt it and use it as 
a foundation for cultural innovations that they then pass on. Although nonhu-
man animal cultures (or proto-cultures) exist, such as seen in chimpanzee 
termite fi shing in the Gombe Stream area,2 their cultural practices are usually 
limited by geography and do not progress over the generations. There is no 
evidence of the “ratchet” effect in nonhuman animal cultures as opposed to 
human cultures—the accumulation, transmission, and progress of cultural 
traditions over time.3 And there are reasons to assert that the differences in 
generativity between nonhuman and human cultures rest on species differ-
ences in teacher and learner transactions.4
Is the difference in brain size between apes and humans enough to 
account for the remarkable difference in the cultures they produce? Can we 
account for culture by an increase in general intelligence (better memories, 
faster processing) or by an adapted intelligence (cognitive accommodations to 




































112 Ann Cale Kruger
ones—those pushing for a better understanding of the physical world and 
thus more impressive amassing of resources, or those that push for coopera-
tive social functioning in complex groups?
In Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, René Girard provides an 
evolutionary model of how this quantitative physical difference in brain size 
produced qualitatively different cultural products, describing the “motor for 
this strange machine.”5 For Girard, brain size increases allowed for comple-
mentary increases in the powers of imitation or mimesis. Inter-individual 
rivalry for objects, acquisitive mimesis, was present in ape ancestors, and 
a source of dangerous confl ict as apes reproduced each other’s aggressive 
behavior in competition for something mutually desired. Mimetic powers 
grew along with brain size in early humans, and the threat mimesis then 
posed (e.g., reciprocal violence no longer constrained by dominance patterns) 
initiated the process of hominization, that is, the process of successive adap-
tations (collective violence, scapegoating, ritual sacrifi ce) allowing species 
survival in the context of deadly mimetic violence. Hominization in turn 
stimulated more complex mimetic systems (rituals, prohibitions, myth) that 
leveraged symbol use to mediate and control rivalry. In Girard’s view, a com-
plete theory of human culture begins with the single principle of mimesis; the 
complexity of human cultural practices emerged to control its growing and 
highly destructive potential.6
In the years following the development of Girard’s expansive and forceful 
theory, developmental psychologists began to describe with greater precision 
the mechanisms of imitation in human children. Foundational discoveries, 
such as the demonstration by Meltzoff and Moore that human infants can 
imitate facial expressions during the second and third week of life (instead 
of between the 8th and 12th month as proposed by Piaget),7 stimulated the 
growth of theory and research on human social cognition more generally, and 
especially on those capacities that are available at the time of birth or develop 
shortly thereafter.8 These questions about prenatal preparations for human 
social life and early postnatal development of social cognitive capacities 
address how human nature refl ects and supports cultural evolution. They led 
to a fl ourishing of research activity in comparative developmental psychology, 
producing descriptions of the similarities and differences in how great apes 
and humans relate to, think about, and learn from others. Through ingenious 
experimental investigations of ape and human capacities for processes such 
as joint attention, language, tool use, theory of mind, mirror self-recognition, 
cooperation, and empathy, Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep 




































Imitation, Communion, and Culture 113
subtle and extensive social cognition of apes, but also have carefully isolated 
their differences from humans.9 Their work has led to the identifi cation of 
a small but powerfully generative difference between ape and human social 
cognition, a capacity that appears early in human ontogeny and that may 
explain the emergence, transmission, and refi nement of human cultural 
traditions. Thus, they have produced support for the Cultural Intelligence 
Hypothesis, the theory that human intellect adapted to function in complex 
social contexts.10
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, and Moll describe a distinctly human propen-
sity to share psychological states (or intentions) with others.11 This motivation 
is present from the earliest weeks of human life and unfolds over the course of 
the fi rst year to support increasingly sophisticated engagements with others 
in a “we-centric” space.12 Sharing psychological states with others is more 
than, but may include, empathy (a matching of moods), perspective-taking 
(a shared reference), embodied synchrony (a mirroring of behaviors), theory 
of mind (an imputation of mental states), or common ground (shared back-
ground knowledge).13 It is having joint thoughts and feelings with another 
person about some aspect of reality when each is aware of the other’s role in 
the commonality. It is a capacity that I will refer to here as communion.
For Tomasello and colleagues, human social cognition follows a develop-
mental pathway that is driven by the infant’s emerging concept of person.14 It 
arises from our shared primate abilities to understand others’ intentions, but 
is transformed by the human desire to share intimate thoughts and feelings 
(which is the fi rst defi nition of “communion” listed in the Compact Oxford 
English Dictionary). It begins with the youngest infants’ understanding of other 
persons as animate actors, and is seen in their dyadic engagement with others 
for the purpose of sharing.
DYADIC ENGAGEMENT
Human life begins in vulnerability. Altricial, and dependent on the care of at 
least one willing provider, humans enter the world comparatively unprepared 
to meet their survival needs. Other primates, and certainly other mammals as 
infants, are faster to fi nd their own food, make their own way, and stay safe. 
However, in comparison to other species, the human is born with especially 
advanced abilities to attend to others and to secure their attention. Babies are 
born with a suite of preparations for social life that are uniquely advanced, 




































114 Ann Cale Kruger
part of the companionship that is such a vibrant and, in fact, defi ning char-
acteristic of the species.15
Newborns are remarkably organized to see, hear, smell, taste, and learn 
about others, especially the mother, from the beginning. They prefer the 
sounds of human language to any other sounds; attend to mother’s voice 
(familiar from uterine experience) and soon thereafter her face, more than 
to any other; favor the smell and taste of her body and her milk; and coordi-
nate their movements and attention to learn about her as much as they can. 
From the fi rst minutes of life, their actions and their affect become synchro-
nized with hers. The tuneful, rhythmical interactions between an infant and 
(usually) her mother start early, develop quickly, and are the foundation for 
future development.16
The contingent and congruent transactions between the infant and care-
giver in the earliest days of life are variously referred to as primary intersub-
jectivity, proto-conversations, interactive synchrony, or affective attunement. 
They may rely on a basic identifi cation with conspecifi cs or the understanding 
of others as “like me.”17 But the focus is on sharing feelings, and the baby’s 
exquisite preparation to engage with others in this way (along with the adult’s 
spontaneous responses to it) secures a place for the baby in the protection 
and affection of the caregiver. These communications between baby and par-
ent illustrate the early human capacity for dyadic transactions. The shared 
emotions are facilitated in a number of modalities (through rhythmic move-
ments or cooing and laughing, for example), but a striking feature of these 
interactions is the mutuality of facial expressiveness, and especially the use of 
mutual eye gaze, to reach interactive attunement.
Infants look at eyes preferentially over other facial features, and coor-
dinate their eye contact with mothers via their mutual vocalizations.18 Eye 
contact serves to initiate or terminate en face encounters, and mutual gaze is 
considered a central component in the formation of attachment. More spe-
cifi cally, young infants are sensitive to the exact direction of another’s gaze 
toward them. As early as fi ve months of age, babies are shown to smile less 
and attend less when their partner’s gaze deviates by as little as 5 degrees.19 
Interestingly, children with autism seem to pay less attention to the eyes of 
others, and are challenged to detect when others are attempting mutual gaze 
with them.20 In situations of complex social-emotional information, high-
functioning individuals with autism dramatically differ from typically devel-
oping children in their frequent and longer focus on the mouth rather than 
the eyes, even when no salient information can be found there.21 Children 




































Imitation, Communion, and Culture 115
but in more typical development from the earliest ages, the eyes are used to 
communicate with others a special, mutually understood connection, and this 
may be foundational for more advanced social and communicative relations.
In chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), infants and mothers also establish com-
municative repertoires that support the baby’s emerging competencies. Their 
mode of communication is primarily tactile, but Bard, Myowa-Yamakoshi, 
Tomonaga, Tanaka, Costall, and Matsuzawa show that in some captive set-
tings chimpanzee mother-infant dyads use mutual gaze, and use it more fl exi-
bly than in other settings.22 Bard and colleagues suggest that visual and tactile 
modalities may be used interchangeably in support of mutual engagement in 
that species. Although chimpanzees may use eye gaze as one of many means 
of infant-caregiver co-regulation, the sensitivity to eye gaze and its direction 
may be particularly human. For example, comparing adult chimpanzees to 
human infants, Tomasello, Hare, Lehmann, and Call have shown that infants 
are more sensitive to another’s eye gaze direction, while chimpanzees fi nd 
head direction more salient.23
TRIADIC ENGAGEMENT
Around 9 months of age, babies begin to understand other persons as inten-
tional agents who engage in actions to accomplish a goal.24 When an adult’s 
goal is hard to discern, infants this age often look to the adult’s eyes for cues, 
and check the adult’s gaze direction to help sort out what the adult intends.25 
They understand the purposeful nature of adult goal-directed action, and 
they can discriminate between accidents and persistent trying along the path 
to success. Infants enter into triadic engagements with adults, sharing goals 
and perspectives regarding a third item in the world, as when a parent and 
child play the simple game of rolling a ball back and forth. The child and 
the adult each know that his or her own and the other’s attention is focused 
jointly, and they think and feel together in the “we-centric” state about an 
aspect of reality—the ball, and their joint intention to roll it to and fro.
COLLABORATIVE ENGAGEMENT
Shortly after the fi rst birthday, babies understand other people as planners. 
They understand that an adult can adopt any of a variety of means to reach a 




































116 Ann Cale Kruger
in collaborative engagements with adults creating and enacting a joint plan. 
By sharing attentions and intentions, infant and adult work with a shared 
commitment to attain a jointly created goal. In most empirical studies of 
adult-infant joint attention, the operational defi nition used is a look to the 
eyes; the infant knows that the adult knows that they are sharing.27 For exam-
ple, some infants this age join adults in a basic turn-taking “conversation” 
using fi rst words or gestures, as in the “What’s that?” pointing and naming 
game so popular with Western toddlers. The infant points at an object, turns 
to look in the mother’s eyes expectantly, and then turns back to the object 
as Mother names it, “the cup!” The one-year-old understands that the roles 
played must be coordinated, and in some activities they are interchangeable. 
In this way, the enterprise of joint thinking itself becomes an object for joint 
contemplation. This state of communion becomes part of the concept of the 
experience itself, and the result is an essentially and deeply social representa-
tion of reality. Arguably these are the very skills necessary to acquire, sustain, 
and advance culture.28
COMPARATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
In many ways, the social lives of humans and other primates are similar. 
Macaques have mirror neurons that resonate to the actions of others,29 infant 
chimpanzees imitate facial expressions,30 and adult chimpanzees emulate the 
results of another’s behavior.31 As Tomasello and Carpenter have shown, apes 
will follow another’s gaze direction and gesture communicatively to bring 
about an instrumental goal.32
Like humans, other species are motivated socially by both competition 
and affi liation, and they use their social skills to act on those motivations 
in appropriate situations. Chimpanzees compete skillfully, create formi-
dable adversarial coalitions, deceive one another to gain advantage, and fi ght 
fi ercely. They also make peace.33 In fact, in all species capable of mirror 
self-recognition (elephants, dolphins, and apes, as well as humans), there 
are demonstrated acts of compassion for unfortunate individuals, such as 
targeted helping and consolation, with no obvious direct advantage to the 
comforter. De Waal argues that the self-other distinction that underlies mirror 
self-recognition supports these pro-social capacities and constitutes a basic 
form of empathy.34
In many ways, the cognitive lives of humans and apes are also similar. 




































Imitation, Communion, and Culture 117
over an ape. Systematic testing comparing young humans (before their cogni-
tion could be radically affected by advanced cultural products) and two ape 
species (adult chimpanzees and orangutans) revealed no differences across 
the three species in tasks involving understanding or manipulating space, 
quantities, or causality.35 Very young human brains have general cognitive 
capacities equivalent to those of the great apes, suggesting that a general intel-
ligence increase with increases in brain size does not fully explain species 
differences.
However, Herrmann and colleagues also showed that two-year-old chil-
dren are dramatically better than apes at tasks recruiting social-cognition 
skills—theory of mind (including gaze following), communication, and espe-
cially social learning (solving a problem by observing a model).36 As Emery 
and Clayton put it, apes are good ethologists, but poor psychologists;37 they 
understand motivations, perceptions, intentions, goals, and even knowledge 
of others, but they do not understand that others have mental representa-
tions of the world.38 In tests of theory of mind, no ape has been found to 
understand false beliefs, which requires a fl exible appreciation of another’s 
mental representation of reality. Nearly all children develop this ability spon-
taneously. Apes will “copy” (emulate) a model’s use of a novel tool, usually 
by reproducing the ends of the demonstrated tool use, but not the means, 
dropping out or changing steps in the modeled routine that are not necessary 
to reach the goal.39 Children not only faithfully copy the means and ends of 
the model’s behavior, but they overimitate, reproducing obviously unimport-
ant and irrelevant details in the model’s behavior, possibly because this is a 
means of learning from adults about causal relations in opaque systems, but 
certainly not solely to obtain the goal.40 In their commitment to reproduce 
every detail of the adult’s behaviors, we see evidence of the powerful motiva-
tion of children to be with others in a special way—to act and think and feel 
with them, even if the short-term gain is not evident.
Apes do not attempt to enter into joint attention with others, to intention-
ally share a common focus for its own sake, as human children do. Only 
children present a toy to an adult for the sole purpose of sharing attention to 
it, for the joy of experiencing it together. Only children, as they are about to 
do a somersault or jump into the pool, shout, “Watch me. Watch me, Mommy. 
Watch me while I do this!” The urgency with which children request another’s 
attention to an action they perform suggests that the action itself is not satis-
factory, or even fully real, unless the other is sharing in it.
This seemingly modest difference between great-ape and human 




































118 Ann Cale Kruger
representations, inviting shared experiences, faithfully reproducing the strat-
egies others use—all are the products of deeply social, collective thought. 
Humans make faithful transmission of culture possible via teaching and 
learning transactions that literally require seeing eye-to-eye. The human 
power to create and transmit culture is the result of the synergy of our com-
mon primate cognitive capacities and our uniquely human desire to enter 
into communion with others. By entering into shared states, we are able to 
learn and transmit the cultural practices and products that are distinctive of 
the species.
The left sides of fi gures 1 and 2 represent the cognitive and social-cognitive 
similarities of humans and apes. They refer to our shared primate heritage of 
understanding the physical world, understanding the intentions and motiva-
tions of others, and our common social emotions fueled by competition and 
affi liation. The right sides represent the key differences in cultural outcomes 
between apes and humans. For apes, individuals live in groups characterized 





































Imitation, Communion, and Culture 119
interactions of their individual capacities. For humans, social life is more than 
the transactions of individuals; it also involves the intentional communion of 
self and other to create “we-centric” spaces. Thus, in human life there is the 
complexity of accumulated and modifi ed cultural traditions, also character-
ized by positive and negative enterprises, but encased in intricate systems 
of meaning. The center of fi gure 2 illustrates the small but powerful species 
difference—the sharing of thoughts and feelings, the communion of psycho-
logical states—that is the source of culture.
Note that human cultural products, created through the powerful force 
of communion, may have initially been motivated by competition or affi lia-
tion. In this sense, the theory of hominization proposed here deviates from 
Girard’s, whose emphasis is on the creation of cultural systems (ritual sac-
rifi ce and prohibitions) to control a communal crisis based on competition 
and uncontrolled mimetic violence. While the practice of ritual sacrifi ce, as 
described by Girard, is ultimately a cultural institution of immense commu-
nal and cooperative action with affi liative means and ends, its initial impetus 
is to curb collective violence based on competition. In the model illustrated 
in fi gures 1 and 2, culture evolves to solve problems of complex social life, 





































120 Ann Cale Kruger
violence based on competition. Perhaps the main question here is whether or 
not scapegoating and its subsequent ritualization was the communal act out 
of which all other cultural institutions originated, as hypothesized by Girard. 
It should be noted, however, that a new data-based theory has been published 
asserting that cooperation was the primary driving force in the evolution of 
human intelligence.41
Just as the human brain is three times the size of the ape brain, the sclera 
(white) of the human eye is three times larger as well. This makes detecting 
the gaze direction of a human very easy, even from some distance. What 
advantage would it serve humans to “give away” to another person the loca-
tion of a resource they have spotted, or the identity of an individual with 
whom they have improperly consorted? Similarly, what is the advantage of 
human sharing? Very early in life, humans are generous with food and eager 
to supply information to others. They freely jump into joint adventures with 
others for no particular reward other than the experience itself. Apes do not 
share food easily, do not offer information, and do not cooperate with others 
unless a certain reward awaits them. Their eye anatomy minimizes the shar-
ing of information since their gaze direction is much harder to detect. The 
Cooperative Eye Hypothesis argues that these anatomical and behavioral dif-
ferences between the species are markers for the different niches into which 
they evolved.42 To live in large and complex social groups, a propensity for 
helping and sharing was an adaptive advantage for individuals. Humans have 
survived, even fl ourished, and been remarkably creative through their funda-
mental ability to share, to help the other, and thus to create intricate cultural 
systems to support life. Of course, humans have negative and destructive 
intentions, but they are often carried out cooperatively (as in armies) and 
collectively symbolized as sanctifi ed.43
CULTURAL LEARNING
Michael Tomasello and I distinguished three types of cultural learning that 
appear over ontogeny (at approximately one, four, and six years, respectively) 
and that rely on engagement with others with shared intentions.44 These are 
descriptions of how an expert and novice, or even two novices, can teach, 
learn, or create new cultural products through the processes of communion. 
Cultural learning is different from social learning, in which others may high-
light certain aspects of the environment, but the learner is left on her own to 




































Imitation, Communion, and Culture 121
the product includes a representation of the other person’s perspective that is 
internalized by the learner.
In imitative learning, the earliest form of cultural learning, toddlers attend 
to the intentions of someone performing a task, and then they represent and 
recreate (sometimes after a delay) the means and the ends of the model. In 
a series of creative experiments, Andrew Meltzoff has shown that when the 
model is frustrated or unsuccessful in her attempts at the task, the toddler 
reproduces what rationally appeared to be the model’s intended behavior and 
outcome, not the accidents or false starts.45 As we have seen, when adults’ 
intended behavior is superfl uous or unnecessary, children still reproduce it 
(overimitation).46 Children are motivated to imitate others not only to repro-
duce their intentions and outcomes, but also to be in a shared state with them.47 
In addition to the qualitative power of shared states, there is a quantitative 
relationship between time spent in joint states and the amount learned.48 For 
example, compared to singletons, twin toddlers have fewer opportunities to 
be in shared, one-on-one states with their parents; the frequency of those 
opportunities positively correlates with their vocabulary size.49
In instructed learning, the teacher and the learner share the intention of 
knowledge transmission. The learner has limited understanding, and the 
teacher has more advanced understanding of the content or procedure to be 
learned. Each must take steps to enable the learner to reach the teacher’s 
understanding, or to reach a lesser but satisfactory level predetermined by 
the instructor. To do this, they communicate about their perspectives on the 
task, and the teacher scaffolds the learner’s experience, creating intermediate 
goals, and monitoring until the learner is successful. They must both work 
determinedly to coordinate their roles and perspectives and to support the 
learner to become eventually more like the teacher.
It is worth noting that adults in every culture intentionally instruct their 
young in this way, focusing on the knowledge or skills they see as being of 
greatest cultural value.50 No other species has been observed to instruct their 
offspring with such intention, and to monitor and adapt the instructional 
interaction until the learner is successful.51 Thus, the we-centric teaching and 
learning described in imitative and instructed learning may explain what 
makes human cultural transmission possible.
In collaborative learning, two individuals begin with comparable levels of 
knowledge and have the shared goal of solving a problem. They may have 
differing perspectives on the task, as in the case of two young girls strug-
gling to divide the limited funds they earned in a weekend lemonade-stand 




































122 Ann Cale Kruger
and critique each other, and ultimately fi nd together a new, more objective 
understanding. Children are more likely to engage in this critical thinking 
with their peers than with their parents, and the more they engage in this 
type of thoughtful exchange, the more they advance in their reasoning.52 The 
initial perspectives, the critical stance, and especially the shared purpose of 
putting their heads together lead the partners to create a new, third perspec-
tive. In this way, collaborators create innovations that advance culture.
COMMUNION AND CULTURE IN THE CLASSROOM
Several years ago, I began to wonder whether the theory of cultural learning 
could be applied to solve practical problems in American education. Is part of 
the problem of American schools the reliance on rote learning at the expense 
of shared psychological states between children and those instructing them? In 
the United States there is an “achievement gap” that begins before the child’s 
fi rst day of school. Children from low-income backgrounds enter kindergarten 
with less than half the vocabulary of their affl uent classmates, placing them at 
high risk for academic failure.53 Unfortunately, in schools with large popula-
tions of such children, kindergarten instruction often does not resemble child-
centered early education, and didactic instruction alone does not suffi ce where 
the needed foundational competencies are not in place. In other words, it does 
not take advantage of the uniquely human forms of learning.
To address these students’ need for enriched social and communicative 
experiences—cultural learning experiences—we introduced an intervention 
in which teaching artists assisted classroom teachers to infuse drama into 
the language-arts curriculum. From my own experience in theater, I know 
that drama is inherently mimetic. It calls upon all participants (playwrights, 
designers, actors, and audience) to identify with each other and to share 
subjective experiences. In effect, it raises “Watch me while I do this!” to an 
art form. I reasoned that for children to become enculturated in the ways of 
school, classroom experiences that invite them to share psychological states 
with others, especially with adults, are necessary.
In our intervention, students, teachers, and artists collaboratively engaged 
in the mimetic art of story; they created characters, communicated intentions, 
and made meaning with each other. Sharing one another’s lived experiences 
is essential to creating even the simplest drama, and we hoped this might 
provide the shared engagements that would support the children’s adaptation 




































Imitation, Communion, and Culture 123
the playwright-teacher, “Nobody cares about little kids anymore, but Mr. P. 
listens to us.”)
Although the intervention was brief, only 13 lessons over two months, we 
hypothesized that the emotionally and linguistically rich experience of joint 
pretense would enhance the children’s language development. We anticipated 
that if students were free to know their teachers and to be known by them 
in this context—to be in communion—their cultural learning, in this case 
learning of language, would fl ourish. During our observation of one class-
room visit by a teaching artist, we learned what the possibilities were for 
children’s engagement and identifi cation. As the artist approached, the stu-
dents scurried about the classroom searching for the storybook they had used 
previously as the starting point for their drama. The book was not to be found, 
but the students kept insisting, “We need the book! Where is the book?” One 
little girl stepped forward to address her classmates, reassuring them with a 
gesture that suggested her entire body was opening like a volume of stories, 
and said, “We don’t need the book. We are the book.” In this proclamation, 
mimesis and communion are found.
To test our hypothesis, we randomly assigned volunteering schools to 
intervention and waiting control conditions. Data were collected each year on 
approximately 100 control and 100 intervention students, 94 percent African 
American, 71 percent classifi ed as low-income. Before and after the interven-
tion, each year for three years, kindergarten students were individually given 
standardized assessments of language development and a creative writing 
task. School administrators provided student achievement data.
Kindergarten students in the drama intervention schools showed superior 
improvement in their writing—the size of the vocabulary they used, the num-
ber of sentences, the structure, the theme, and the resolution of their stories 
all improved compared to controls. They also were signifi cantly more likely 
to improve in their performance on tests of syntax development than were the 
students in the control schools. We followed the students as they entered fi rst 
and second grade to measure any enduring effects of the 13 drama lessons. 
Without the benefi t of any further intervention, the students who were in 
drama intervention schools in kindergarten had superior report-card grades 
and superior language-arts achievement-test scores in fi rst grade, and con-
tinued to have superior report-card grades in second grade. Students with 
special needs benefi ted even more. We have embarked on a four-year study 
to adapt this intervention to the needs of kindergarten students with limited 
English profi ciency, testing to see if we can enhance their performance in 




































124 Ann Cale Kruger
process of shared story-making will support the language acquisition of these 
children to a greater degree that the standard instructional practices do.
Formal education in schools is designed for the transmission of culture. 
However, large national studies in the United States show that the home envi-
ronment accounts for most of the variance in students’ achievement. Many 
low-income children enter school without the advantage of cultural consis-
tency between home and school; the supportive processes we associate with 
fi rst-language acquisition, such as are found in the linguistic environment of 
the home, must be experienced in the classroom for them to succeed. Creat-
ing an environment in school that supports the child’s powerful motivation to 
share feelings and intentions with others will enhance the cultural learning 
opportunities these children need to become a part of the school community. 
Communion and cultural learning are the natural process and product of rich 
human engagement, in the classroom as elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
One of the unique and central features of hominization is the pervasive devel-
opmental importance of shared states, or communion. Chimpanzees have 
impressive capabilities, but they do not have this. As children grow, com-
munion becomes the foundation of cultural learning—fi rst imitative learning, 
then instructed learning, and fi nally, the most creative process, collaborative 
learning. Traditional educational methods, especially for disadvantaged chil-
dren, have failed to take advantage of this uniquely human developmental 
course. Recent interventions with drama in disadvantaged schools suggest 
that supporting these processes can make a signifi cant practical difference in 
how children learn. The role of mimesis in learning with and through stories 
has only begun to be explored, and the power and generativity of communion 
in the classroom, the shared intimacies of thought and feeling, may hold the 
key to genuine educational reform and would better refl ect what we know to 
be the unique human capacity for cultural learning.
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